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Abstract 
 
This paper compares different nominal anchors in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime for 
the future single regional currency of the Economic Community of the West African States 
(ECOWAS).  We study the anchor choice when the countries focus the exchange rate policy 
to promote internal and external competitiveness. We consider four foreign anchor currencies: 
the us dollar, the euro, the yen and the yuan.  Using a counterfactual analysis, we find little 
support for a dominant peg in the ECOWAS zone. In attempting to select an anchor currency, 
as regards internal and external competitiveness, several aspects need to be taken into 
consideration: the variability of the commodity prices, adverse downward trend movements, 
the stability of export revenues and the invoicing currency. A discriminating element is the 
direction toward which the anchor currency moves, while the world price of commodities 
evolves in the opposite direction. Our simulations show that the countries would not agree on 
the same anchor if they pursue several goals: maximizing the export revenues, minimizing 
their variability, stabilizing them and minimizing the real exchange rate misalignments from 
its fundamental value.  
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1.- Introduction 
 There is today a renewed interest in the formation of monetary unions in Africa. Several 
common currencies are planned for the future years, in the Economic community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), in the East African Community (EAC), in the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Even, a single currency is envisaged at the level 
of the African continent.  
 This paper focus on the case of ECOWAS, where preparation towards a single regional 
currency seems to be more advanced in comparison with the other regions. Though the 
ECOWAS comprises countries with fixed and flexible exchange rates (see Table A.1 in 
appendix), a monetary area is already in place since nearly 60 years (the CFA zone). 
Moreover, the preparation of a new regional currency is relatively advanced in the West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) where a single currency is going to be born during the 
transition to the ECOWAS single currency1.  
  Not surprisingly, an abundant literature has studied the challenges of a single currency in 
the ECOWAS zone, by examining several issues: 
 -the benefits of a single currency as regards the optimum currency area criteria (see, among 
others, Bangaké (2008), Dupasquier et al. (2005)), trade and financial market integration 
(Gbetnkom (2006), Goretti and Weisfeld (2008), Masson (2008), Sy (2008); 
 -the regional or idiosyncratic nature of shocks facing the countries (Bénassy-Quéré and 
Coupet (2005), Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008), Xiaodan and Yoonbai (2009), Dufrenot 
(2009a); 
 -the coordination of macroeconomic policies as regards the possibility of bail-out and free-
riding behaviours (Debrun et al. (2005), Masson and Patillo (2001, 2002) and nominal 
convergence (Alagidede et al. (2008), Dufrenot (2009b)). 
 From these studies, a consensus seems to be that the venture should be put on a hold, 
because of the heterogeneity of the countries’ sensibility to shocks, the many obstacles to 
regional integration, the failure to build common policy institutions making their influence on 
the countries’ commitment and the fact that the ECOWAS countries should allow for stepped-
up efforts to make the funds available to the regional institutions (conversely to Europe, there 
are no equivalent of the “structural funds”).  
                                                 
1The  CFA  zone  was  born  in  the  fifties  and  is  a  monetary  area  in  West  Africa  with  a  partially  convertible 
currency, the CFA Franc. The convertibility, vis‐à‐vis the Euro,  is guaranteed by the French Treasury.  The CFA 
zone  overlaps with  the WAEMU  area  (West African  Economic  and Monetary Union)  that  comprises mostly 
French speaking countries which were former colonies of France (except Guinea‐Bissau): Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte  d’Ivoire,  Guinea‐Bissau,  Mali,  Niger,  Senegal  and  Togo.  The  West  African  Monetary  zone  (WAMZ)  is 
expected  to be created  in 2014 and would comprise Ghana,  the Gambia, Guinea, Sierra‐Leone, and Nigeria. 
Today, these countries have their own domestic currencies which are inconvertible. In 2014 they countries will 
abandon  their domestic  currencies  and use a  single  currency within  the WAMZ  (the West African Currency 
Unit, WACU). After that, in 2020, the two zones (CFA and WAMZ) will merge and all the countries will use the 
future single currency, the ECO.  
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 Notwithstanding the “cautious” views that emerge from the academic works, the project of 
building a single currency for the ECOWAS countries is receiving a widespread support by 
the governments and the heads of states in member countries. Their debate touches on the 
benefits of the precursor CFA zone whose birth resulted from a political decision (between 
France and its former colonies) nearly 60 years ago, though the economic requirements 
needed for a monetary area were not satisfied. The CFA zone country benefited from low 
inflation rates, more fiscal discipline than the non-CFA countries, a more stable economic and 
financial environment (see Gulde and Tsangarides (2008), Dufrénot and Sakho (2008), 
Masson and Patillo (2004)). Accordingly, the politicians’ leitmotiv is “let us go ahead”. As a 
consequence, this has re-energized a new direction of research during the recent years with a 
focus on the problems the countries will face once the single currency is in place (the 
approach is now prospective). 
 Among the new questions, the choice of the exchange rate regime is at the forefront of the 
discussions though the academic work at still in a burgeoning step and rare. Some authors are 
concerned with the trade-off between floating and fixed exchange rate. For instance, Batte et 
al. (2008) study such a trade-off by simulating a two-country Dutch disease model in a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. They examine how the terms of trade 
would spread across the zone and conclude that the countries may disagree about the optimal 
exchange rate regime. However, as pointed out by Gulde (2008), the West African 
policymakers have a “fear of floating”. This stems from the fact that central bankers are aware 
of the need for credibility in order to overcome the market pressures, attract foreign investors, 
avoid the negative impact of the commodity price volatility on the economy, fond an anchor 
the expectations of inflation. Most of all, they lack the monetary and financial infrastructure 
to manage a flexible rate system. Against this background, many advocate for a fixed 
exchange rate2.  
 Fixed exchange rates regimes can be defined under different systems: managed float (as is 
the case of Ghana and Nigeria today with the US dollar as the benchmark currency), currency 
board (as is the case of the CFA zone countries though the central bank does not officially 
declare it as its exchange rate system), and dollarization. As regards the current debate, this 
paper assumes that policy-makers in the ECOWAS countries will have a preference toward an 
exchange rate peg – an anchor to an internationally traded currency - and that their choice will 
consist in examining which external peg would be the best (we do not consider the case of a 
peg to a basket of currencies3; neither do we study the case of crawl pegs). 
 There are many ways of examining this question that are not examined here. Indeed, we 
could study whether the ECOWAS countries form an optimum currency area with the 
countries to which they would peg their currency, or look at other determinants of anchor 
choices (such as the share of trade with the anchor country, the proportion of the countries’ 
external debt denominated in the anchor currency, the synchronicity of business cycles with 
                                                 
2 However, the dilemma between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes in the ECOWAS zone is still an open 
debate. For the pro arguments in favor of floating regimes, see Michailof (2007), Diboglu and Sissoko (2006).  
3 A peg  to  a  single  currency may be  preferred  to  an  anchor  to  a basket  of  currency because of  its  greater 
transparency. 
4 
 
the anchor country, portfolio motives, the need for low inflation rates, etc). However, the 
main focus of the paper is on competitiveness, neglecting other aspects that may be relevant 
for the choice of a currency peg.  
 We want to study the anchor choice when the countries focus the exchange rate policy to 
promote internal and external competitiveness.  We consider four foreign currencies: the us 
dollar, the euro, the yen and the yuan. Following Frankel and Saiki (2002), we consider an 
external anchor through a rigid peg to these currencies4. This assumption implies that, under a 
peg, we would observe a convergence of the inflation rates between the African countries and 
the foreign countries whose currency serves as the anchor. Another implication is that the 
African countries would have scarce ability to run an independent monetary policy (as is the 
case today of the CFA Franc zone countries vis-à-vis France’s monetary policy). The reason 
for considering the euro and the US dollar as possible anchor currencies is straightforward. 
We also consider the yuan since China now occupies the bulk of the exports of some 
ECOWAS countries. Moreover, since the last 10 years, the ECOWAS countries have been 
trading more with the emerging countries in East Asia. Up until now, many of these countries 
have retained the dollar as their invoice currency. However, due to their increasing regional 
integration with Japan and the current dollar turmoil, they may decide in the future to use the 
yen as an invoice currency.  
 As to the methodology, the paper builds on a counterfactual analysis. Our goal is to see 
what would have happened, had the countries been pegged to international currencies. We do 
not attempt to build and calibrate a realistic full macro or micro-founded models. We simply 
explore “toy” models that can help isolate some salient features that may influence the choice 
of the future peg as regards internal and external competitiveness. Both these objectives are 
important for the ECOWAS countries because they are small exporting commodity countries. 
Their heavy dependence on export revenues affects the other macroeconomic indicators: 
fiscal positions, debt ratios, real incomes, etc. That is why, central to our analysis is the role 
played by the real prices of exported commodities. The latter influences the profitability of 
exports and the degree of misalignments of the real exchange rates.  
 One conclusion that emerges from this paper is that little support can be found for a 
dominant peg in the ECOWAS zone. In attempting to select an anchor currency, as regards 
internal and external competitiveness, several aspects need to be taken into consideration: the 
variability of the commodity prices, adverse downward trend movements and the stability of 
export revenues. A discriminating element is the direction toward which the anchor currency 
moves, while the world price of commodities evolves in the opposite direction. Our 
simulations show that the countries would not agree on the same anchor if they pursue three 
goals: maximizing the export revenues, minimizing their variability and stabilizing them. A 
similar contradiction between the countries is found when the objective is external 
competitiveness, in particular when they search to minimize the misalignments of the real 
exchange rate from its fundamental value. What is at play here is the contradictory evolutions 
                                                 
4 The authors study the comparative advantages of pegging a domestic currency to an  international currency 
and  to  the  price  of  commodities  in  commodity  exporting  countries.  They  sample  include  the  ECOWAS 
countries, but they mainly discuss the advantages of a commodity currency, which  is out of the scope of this 
paper.  
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of the anchor currency and the currency in which the countries invoice their export prices. 
The main ECOWAS trading partners differ somewhat across countries, so that some invoice 
their price in euro while others do so in dollar, thereby implying different degrees of 
misalignments.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some stylized facts 
concerning the ECOWAS countries’ dependence on commodity exports. Section 3 discusses 
the implications on the internal competitiveness under alternative pegs. Section 4 deals with 
external competitiveness by studying the misalignments of the real exchange rates if the 
countries had been pegged respectively to the dollar, the euro, the yen and the yuan. Finally, 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2.- Some stylized facts on the ECOWAS countries’ dependence on commodity exports 
 Usually, the African countries’ dependence on a few commodities for the bulk of their 
export earnings presents serious challenges in terms of internal and external competitiveness. 
The controversies over the former concern the impact of price changes, their variability and 
resistance to shocks on the profitability of exports. The latter is taken as a proxy of internal 
competitiveness because lower export incomes yield a decrease in the activities of the export 
sector and a shift of resources to the sectors of non-traded goods. Conversely, higher export 
revenues imply a reduction in the resources allocated to the non-traded good sector.  
 Table 1 shows the export shares of the ECOWAS countries’ main commodities during the 
period from 1999 to 2008. It is seen that for a majority of them the share exceed 50% and 
even the ratio is above 75% in some countries (for instance Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Nigeria, Sierra-Leone) which reflects an overwhelming dependence on export revenues from 
the exported commodities. To explain why such a commodity-dependence enhances 
important questions regarding the exchange rate peg regime, we take some illustrations of 
events that happened during the last decade.  
 The prices of the commodities exported by the ECOWAS countries increased sharply since 
2002 in comparison with their previous levels. Even, the substantial rises in the commodity 
prices were exacerbated by the depreciation of the dollar against the other international 
currencies. For instance, between 2006 and 2007, the depreciation was 27% against the euro. 
However, the substantial price increases did not fully reflected in the export revenues of those 
countries whose currencies were pegged to currencies that appreciated against the dollar. This 
was the case for the WAEMU countries. UNCTAD( 2008) evaluates that, when corrected by 
the variations of the exchange rate, the prices increases in the countries not pegged to the 
dollar was half of the others. Between May 2007 and May 2008 (a period of the highest price 
increases) the surge in food, mineral and other non-fuel commodity was of 41.9% in dollar 
prices, but only of 23.3% in euro. As a consequence, the export profitability was weakened in 
some countries. This was accentuated in the WAEMU region by the fact that the rise of oil 
prices, although limited by the peg to the euro, increased the cost of production of the 
exported commodities (higher transport costs, rise in the prices of the fertilizers and in the 
cost of exploitation of minerals). 
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 As shown by figure A1, in appendix, while evolving on an upward trend since the 
beginning 2000’s, the commodity prices have been also highly volatile. A rise in the volatility 
of commodity prices implies an instability and unpredictability of export earnings, thereby 
implying both an uncertainty on the investment and a rise in the cost of financing. Ample 
fluctuations in the commodity price are not a recent phenomenon, but the measures 
undertaken so far to stabilize the export revenues have been more or less successful 
(compensatory financing schemes, stabilization mechanisms, risk, management instruments, 
etc). 
Table 1. Main exporting commodities and their shares in West Africa 
Member 
countries 
Main exporting commodities and shares 
Benin Cotton 62.4% 
Burkina Faso Cotton 65.7% 
Cape Verde Oils petroleum 40.8%  Cargo containers 12.1% 
Côte d'Ivoire Cacao 23.2%  Oils petroleum 21.8% 
Gambia, The Ground-nuts 30.6% 
Ghana Gold 30.3%  Cacao 28.4% 
Guinea Aluminum 69.6%  Gold 20.2% 
Guinea-Bissau Vegetables 51.6%  Fish 28.3% 
Mali Gold 64.9%  Cotton 23.8% 
Niger Uranium 47.2% 
Nigeria Oils petroleum 97.2% 
Senegal Oils petroleum 18.7%  Phosphate 11% 
Sierra Leone Coffee 86.5% 
Togo Portland cement 15%  Phosphate 13.6%  Cotton 10.3% 
            Source: UN Comtrade database. The exporting commodity shares are averaged index  
                            during the period of 1999-2006. We refer to only the shares more than 10%. 
 
 Since the beginning 2000’s, new suggestions have emerged concerning the role that 
monetary and exchange rate policies could play in helping the countries to cope with the 
negative effects of commodity price volatility on the exports earnings. In a series of papers, 
Frankel (2003, 2005) argues that small countries which are dependent on commodity exports 
should peg their currency to an export price index. Such a proposition has not receive as much 
enthusiasm as it should have, but even if one does not share Frankel’s view, it is usually 
agreed that countries with pegged currencies face less volatile commodity prices than those 
with a flexible exchange rate. Such a conclusion holds for the ECOWAS countries, as shown 
by Cashin et al. (2002).  
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 The authors compare the volatility of the real exchange rate of commodity currencies in the 
developing countries (countries for which there exists a level relationship between the real 
effective exchange rate and their commodity export prices) over the years 1980-2002. Though 
the authors conclude that, on average, the exchange rate regime does not matter, Table 2, 
which contains their results for some ECOWAS countries, shows that the exchange rate 
volatility is more than the double in a country with a managed float like Ghana compared with 
others with a pegged currency (like Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger or Togo).  
 Moreover, the ratio of volatility (volatility of the nominal exchange rate deflated by the 
volatility of the relative price) indicates that the observed differences in volatilities come from 
the variations of the nominal exchange rate. So, pegging one’s currency seems to have been a 
better choice to attenuate the commodity price volatility. In this paper, we go a step further by 
examining which foreign currency would have been the best external anchor yielding the 
lowest variability in the export revenues.   
 
Table 2.  Volatility of the real exchange rates of some ECOWAS countries 
1980-2002 - (Source Cashin et al. (2003)) 
      
Countries  Exchange rate Volatility of real Volatility of nominal Volatility of relative Ratio of 
 regime effective exchange effective exchange price levels volatility 
   rate rate   
Côte d'Ivoire  peg 0,043 0,044 0,014 3,1 
Ghana freely floating 0,114 0,122 0,026 4,7 
Mali peg 0,044 0,042 0,027 1,6 
Niger peg 0,051 0,043 0,025 1,7 
Togo peg 0,047 0,043 0,018 2,4 
 
       Another important issue for the ECOWAS countries concerns the impact of the 
commodity price on their real exchange rate and external competitiveness (as reflected by the 
misalignment of the real exchange rate in regard to its fundamental level). In a recent paper, 
Coudert et al. (2008) argue that peg regimes influence the degree of misalignments of the real 
exchange rates in countries that are commodity-dependent. For instance, they show that over 
the years 1980-2007, countries pegged to the euro faced an overvaluation of their currencies 
while those pegged to the dollar (or with a floating exchange rate) experienced an 
undervaluation. They conduct a panel data-based analysis and their sample includes only 5 
ECOWAS countries (among which 4 from WAEMU). From their study, one would expect the 
WAEMU countries’ external competitiveness to have deteriorated over the recent years, while 
conversely, the other ECOWAS members in particular Ghana and Nigeria would have 
benefited from the depreciation of the dollar. However, the studies based on time series do not 
corroborate this intuition for the individual countries. Abdih and Tsangarides (2008) show 
that, since the beginning 2000’s, real exchange rate misalignments have been very small in 
the WAEMU countries (they find no statistically significant difference with the estimated 
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equilibrium level) though their regressions include the fluctuations in the terms of trade as one 
key determinant of the real exchange rate. Aliyu (2009) and Iossifov and Loukoianova (2007) 
conduct a similar study respectively on Nigeria and Ghana. The authors show that the real 
world prices of these countries are important determinants of the real exchange rate. However, 
their conclusions in terms of misalignments of the exchange rate since the 2000’s are mixed: 
the currencies alternate between under- and overvaluation. 
 So to speak, it is still difficult to say which exchange rate regime is better to minimize the 
misalignment of the real exchange rate in the ECOWAS countries. However, the results 
obtained previously in the literature can be criticized on the point that they use a theoretical 
framework that does not suit the situation of the commodity-dependent countries. In 
particular, it is not straightforward that variables such as the Balassa-Samuelson effects, the 
interest rate differences or capital inflows are good explanatory variables for the ECOWAS 
countries that still have non-matured financial system, capital control and weak industrial 
bases. As a consequence, we propose re-examining the question of the implication of the peg 
regimes on the real exchange rate of these countries by using a theoretical framework more 
suitable for the ECOWAS countries (a dependent economy model for small commodity 
exporting countries).  
 
3.- Which peg would have been the best for internal competitiveness?  
 This section evaluates competing pegs according to their ability to lead the highest and 
more stable export profitability or internal competitiveness. The counterfactual experiment 
consists in examining what would have been the dynamics of the real commodity prices if the 
ECOWAS countries had peg to the dollar, the yen, the yuan, the euro. We also consider the 
case of a peg to the price of the commodities, as suggested for instance by Frankel. The 
simulated paths are compared with the exchange rate policy the countries actually followed. 
We concentrate on the evolution of the real commodities themselves without examining the 
impact for the performance of debt ratio, exports, growth, etc. Our main interest is to see 
whether the countries have an incentive to move to the production of exported commodities 
from other activities, or in the opposite direction. Further, we want to see whether pegging to 
a foreign currency would have stabilized the real price of the commodities. 
 
3.1.- A definition of internal competitiveness 
 Internal competitiveness can be apprehended in several manners. A wisdom definition for 
the small dependent countries, as reflected by the Salter-Swan approach, is the ratio of the 
relative prices of the traded-good to non-traded goods. This reflects how the same goods 
(some being produced locally, while others are imported) compete in the domestic markets. 
Such a definition is used to account for the impact of productivity shocks stemming from the 
sector of tradable on the prices of the nontradable. This approach is appropriate, if there is 
indeed a competition on the domestic markets between imports and locally produced goods, 
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which is not necessarily the case in the ECOWAS countries (imports and non-traded goods 
and services have different usages)5.  
 Another wisdom definition of internal competitiveness, for the countries that are exporters 
of commodity goods and for which the export sector accounts for an important share of GDP, 
is the relative profitability of non-tradable and export production. It indicates whether 
domestic producers have an incentive to shift resources from one sector to another.  
 Consider a small open country with an economy categorized as producing a domestic non-
traded good and an exportable good (primary commodity such as agricultural or mineral 
product). The production of both the exported and domestic goods is obtained with labor as 
the only factor and the production functions are: 
  XXX Ly α=   and  NNN Ly α=   ,  (1) 
where Xy  is the output of the exported good, Ny  is output of the non-traded good, XL  and 
NL  are the amounts of labor employed in the sectors of exported and non-traded good, Xα  
and Nα  capture labor productivity in the respective sectors.  
 It is assumed that labour is freely mobile across both sectors and that there is perfect 
competition in the non-traded good sector. Noting yp  the GDP deflator and Y  the volume 
aggregate output, the aggregate production in the economy is given by: 
  XXNNy YEPYPYp +=  . (2) 
Dividing by Y  and denoting the share of exports to GDP XS  yields: 
Y
YEP
Y
YPp XXNNy +=   , 
)1(
)(
X
XXy
N S
EPSpP −
−=  , (3) 
where XP  and NP  are the prices of the exported and of non-traded commodities. XP  is 
assumed to be exogenous. E  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the amount of local 
currency per foreign currency.  
 From the demand side, the economy is composed of a continuum of consumers that supply 
labor inelastically and consume the non-traded good and an imported good. The consumer 
price index (CPI)  is a weighted average of both goods and is written as  
  γγγ −−= 11 MN PPEP , (4) 
where MP  is the price of the imported good supposed to be exogenous. We assume a perfect 
index.  
 Dividing both sides of (3) by P yields  
                                                 
5 Using  panel  data  techniques,  Drine  and  Rault  (2003)  find  that  the  Balassa‐Samuelson  effect  is  strongly 
rejected for many West African countries.  
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 Assuming that the wages are indexed to the CPI, equation (5) says that the margin rate in 
the non-traded good sector (as measured by the ratio of the unit price to unit labor cost) varies 
inversely with the margin rate in the export sector (as measured by the ratio of export prices 
in domestic currency to unit labor cost).  
 From a domestic producer, there is a trade-off between producing in the non-traded good 
sector and producing in the export sector. A decrease in the nominal export price diminishes 
the profitability of the activity in this sector but raises the unit margin rate in the non-traded 
good sector. Against this background, an increase in the real price of the exports is 
synonymous of higher internal competitiveness for the exported goods, while a decrease 
means lower internal competitiveness. 
 
3.2.- Data 
 We construct a new monthly dataset of country-specific nominal and real export price over 
the period from 1999 to 2008. The nominal export price indices are weighted averages of 
world commodity prices in dollar using the ECOWAS countries’ export shares as weights. 
The prices are then converted in local currency, the bilateral exchange rate being the parity of 
the anchor currency vis-à-vis the dollar. We make the assumption that a peg is strong enough 
and permanent to achieve convergence of inflation rates and therefore deflate the nominal 
commodity price by the consumer price index of the country which serves as the anchor6.    
 For lack of data, Liberia is excluded from our sample. The frequency of the data is 
monthly. We begin in 1999 because this corresponds to the year of adoption of the euro and 
because we do not want our data to be “contaminated” by the effects of the 1994 devaluation 
of the CFA Franc in the WAEMU countries. The monthly real commodity prices are formed 
as set out below. 
 For each country, we select the three main commodities exported, as reflected by their 
share in total exports. The latter are taken from UN COMTRADE data provided by the UN 
statistical department. Then, we calculate for each commodity, their share in the total exports 
of the three main commodities. This gives us weights that are used to construct a monthly 
index of commodity export price. This index is thus defined as a geometric weighted average 
of the nominal prices of the three main commodities exported by a country. The dollar-based 
nominal prices of the commodities are taken from the IMF’s IFS database and AFRISTAT 
data. 
 To define the real prices, we also consider the consumer price indices of both the 
ECOWAS countries and the countries whose currency serves as an external anchor (China, 
                                                 
6The assumption of convergence of  inflation rates  is not strong given the current situation of some countries 
within the ECOWAS area, the CFA zone countries, that have pegged their currency to the euro and which have 
inflation rates that evolve in phase with the inflation rate of the euro zone.   
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Euro zone, Japan, the United States). Similarly, to express the prices in local currency we 
choose both the bilateral exchange rates of the ECOWAS and industrialized countries vis-à-
vis the dollar (see the next section).  
 The countries included in the sample are the ECOWAS countries, except Liberia: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  
  
3.3.- Construction of the simulated paths 
 The path of the real commodity prices are constructed according to alternative peg 
configurations. We follow Frankel and Saiki (2002)’ s methodology. The currency regimes 
are defined as follows: 
 1/ Actual exchange rate regime:  , 
 2/ Dollar peg:  , 
 3/ Yen peg:  , 
 4/ Euro peg:  , 
 5/ Yuan peg:  , 
 6/ Commodity peg:  . 
 is the us-based index of the nominal commodity price,  and  are the consumer price 
index of the country K and country K’s bilateral exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar 
(K=domestic country, the USA, Japan, the euro zone, China).  (K=US, J, eur, chn, x) are 
constants calculated so as to express all the real prices in the same base and allow 
comparisons. More specifically, the constants are calculated so as to make the logarithm of 
the commodity over period the 1999-2008 equal under a given regime to what it was in actual 
history. We compute the logarithmic deviations between the real prices under a given peg and 
the real price under actual history.   
 
3.4.- An anchor for three goals : maximization and stabilization of the export revenues 
and minimization of their variability 
  Figure 1 plots the evolution over time of the nominal exchange rates of the yen, the yuan 
Renminbi and the euro against the dollar. Up until the mid 2005 the yuan renmibi remain 
stable and then appreciated being on a stable uptrend from July 2005 to the end 2008. The 
euro depreciated from its launch in January 1999 to the beginning 2002’s and then 
appreciated steadily from 2002 onwards. The parity of the yen was slightly more cyclical with 
periods of rises and falls that alternated over the years. 
 Figure A.2 in appendix shows the simulated real commodity prices under alternative 
currency pegs (in deviation from actual history). For a majority of countries, we distinguish 
two distinct periods corresponding to the years from 1999 to 2002 and from 2003 to 2008. 
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They correspond respectively to downward and upward trends in the world price of the main 
commodities exported by the countries.  
During the years of declining prices (1999 to 2002), the highest real prices are obtained when 
they are expressed in terms of the euro or in terms of the commodity prices themselves. This 
means that if all the countries had been pegged to the euro, their export revenues would have 
been higher compared to the real prices that they actually faced. This was indeed the case for 
the CFA zone countries which compensated the declining commodity prices in the world 
markets by a depreciating CFA franc (pegged to the euro) against the dollar. The line 
representing the real commodity price under a peg to the euro (in comparison to the historical 
prices) is thus around zero for the WAEMU countries. A similar conclusion holds for Cape 
Verde. During the period of the late 1990s to the beginning 2000s, Ghana and Nigeria floating 
exchange rates and their exchange rate regimes yielded a better situation than they would 
have faced if they would have been tied to an international foreign currency other than the 
euro (the curves representing the simulated path for the yen, the yuan and the dollar are under 
the zero lines). Whatever the degree of flexibility of their exchange rates, the Gambia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea gave more weight to the dollar and this is shown by the curve 
corresponding to the dollar peg fluctuating around zero.  
 
Figure 1. Nominal exchange rates per US dollar (1999-2008) 
 
 
1999-2002: period of decreasing world commodity prices 
  However, for all the countries, pegging directly their currency to the price of their 
main exported commodities would have been a better choice than a peg to a foreign currency, 
even if the latter was depreciating when the real commodity prices in dollar were declining in 
the world markets. The question of commodity-based exchange rates was a hotly debated 
issue in the beginning 2000s as an appropriate medium-term nominal anchor in the 
developing countries specialized in the production of minerals or agricultural goods. The idea 
was popularized in several papers by Frankel (see the references above). Such a policy would 
have had several advantages for the ECOWAS countries.  
 Firstly, a peg to the commodity prices would have enhanced their internal competitiveness 
and boosted their exports over their actual levels (supply responses to higher export revenues) 
and this would have had positive effects on their external equilibrium thereafter (by lowering 
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their debt constraint). Indeed, the weak commodity prices, in dollar terms, paved the way to 
debt and balance of payment crises that appeared later during the 2000s.  
 An additional advantage of a commodity peg would have been the following. This 
nominal anchor would have avoided the pro-cyclical negative effects of export revenue 
fluctuations on debt crises. Indeed, the period of declining commodity prices was 
characterized by outflows of capital (especially in the non-CFA zone countries) which obliged 
the countries to borrow money in the international capital markets with increased risk premia. 
Beyond this period, when the prices began to re-increase, the foreign investors were not back 
immediately in the domestic financial markets. So, even with higher export revenues the 
governments had to continue borrowing abroad. With a nominal anchor such as the 
commodity prices, capital flows would have been stable because exports revenues exert a 
smoothing effect on the financial cycle (the investors know that the countries borrow during 
bad times and reimburse once the commodity prices began to re-increase). What matters 
under a commodity peg are not the fluctuations of the prices but their medium-term levels.   
 
2003 onwards: period of increasing world commodity prices 
 As expected, the highest real prices are obtained with a peg to the yen, which depreciated 
against the dollar, more than the other international currencies, during the years of surge of 
the commodity prices. For the CFA zone countries, pegging to the euro was their worst choice 
(putting aside the commodity peg). Indeed, this peg implied an appreciation of the CFA franc 
against the dollar and “reduced” the export income in local currency. Shifting the input 
resources to non-traded good sectors was more profitable and such a situation led the 
policymakers to question whether the euro peg was still appropriate for the WAEMU 
countries.   
 
Minimizing real price fluctuations 
 It is noteworthy that a commodity peg would induce no variability at all. However, it is 
not desirable to have zero variability in the export prices. For instance, in times of rising debt 
service, the countries may search to boost the export revenues and thus to experience a sharp 
increase of the real prices. As a consequence, we shall not consider explicitly the case of 
commodity peg. Whether or not the prices are characterized by ample fluctuations around 
their mean value is important owing to the need of stabilizing export revenues to service debt 
obligations (especially in a context where countries face external borrowing constraints). 
Moreover, an increased variability of the real prices influences the supply of the commodity 
because it means a greater uncertainty for the producers. Finally, the large movements in 
commodity prices have bad consequences on real incomes and fiscal positions of the 
countries.  
 We consider two measures of price variability. We first compute the coefficient of 
variation (ratio of standard deviation over the mean over the whole period) and further 
consider the percentage of months outside 50% of mean. These are computed for both the 
nominal and real price commodities (Table 3). Under actual history, some of the variability of 
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the real commodity prices was due to the effect of the denomination of the commodity prices 
in dollars at a time of fluctuating exchange rates, especially in those countries with a 
completely floating exchange rate, like Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria. In the latter, the 
coefficient of variation is at least twice as high for the nominal prices as for the real prices 
(Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria). For the CFA zone countries, the higher variability of the 
nominal prices owes to slow adjusting national price levels during the period under study. 
Since the CFA franc has been tied to the euro, the countries imported a portion of their 
inflation from the euro zone (their main trading partner) and the latter was not volatile. 
Moreover, in a majority of these countries, the prices of non-tradables remained stable over 
the period under examination. However, two exceptions are Benin and Burkina Faso, where 
the real price are more volatile than the nominal prices. The movements of domestic inflation 
in Nigeria affect the volatility of the CPI in Benin because of the importance of frontier trade. 
In Burkina Faso, the CPI is more volatile than in the other countries because of the high 
proportion of food commodity in the basket of non-traded goods (this country has been more 
severely affected by exogenous shocks, such as drought, than the others).  
 
Table 3. The Variability of the real prices under a given peg 
3.1. Standard Deviation / Average 
 Type1 
Actual 
History 
 
Type2 
Hypothetical 
Dollar peg 
Type3 
Hypothetical 
Yen peg 
Type4 
Hypothetical 
Euro peg 
Type5 
Hypothetical 
Yuan peg 
Benin 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.14 
Burkina Faso 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.14 
Cape Verde 0.37 0.51 0.56 0.37 0.46 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.19 0.33 0.39 0.21 0.29 
Gambia, The 0.39 0.33 0.37 0.21 0.29 
Ghana 0.22 0.28 0.34 0.16 0.24 
Guinea 0.33 0.24 0.31 0.15 0.22 
Guinea-Bissau 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.16 0.19 
Mali 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.14 0.23 
Niger 0.76 0.85 0.94 0.74 0.83 
Nigeria 0.31 0.51 0.57 0.37 0.46 
Senegal 0.44 0.62 0.67 0.46 0.53 
Sierra Leone 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.21 0.23 
Togo 0.39 0.58 0.61 0.42 0.48 
ALL --- 0.36 0.42 0.22 0.31 
To compare the cases for each country, the indexes like standard deviation divided by the average are 
used.  
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3.2. Percentage of months outside 0.5 of mean 
 Type1 
Actual 
History 
 
Type2 
Hypothetical 
Dollar peg 
Type3 
Hypothetical 
Yen peg 
Type4 
Hypothetical 
Euro peg 
Type5 
Hypothetical 
Yuan peg 
Benin 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 
Burkina Faso 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 
Cape Verde 12.5% 20.8% 30.8% 11.7% 20.8% 
Côte d'Ivoire 1.7% 9.2% 13.3% 3.3% 5.0% 
Gambia, The 12.5% 9.2% 10.0% 4.2% 8.3% 
Ghana 0.8% 8.3% 9.2% 0.8% 2.5% 
Guinea 15.0% 2.5% 13.3% 0.8% 0.8% 
Guinea-Bissau 0.8% 2.5% 5.0% 0.8% 3.3% 
Mali 0.0% 6.7% 11.7% 0.0% 0.8% 
Niger 46.7% 71.7% 72.5% 42.5% 70.0% 
Nigeria 8.3% 22.5% 31.7% 14.2% 25.0% 
Senegal 10.8% 13.3% 17.5% 10.8% 13.3% 
Sierra Leone 3.3% 2.5% 5.8% 5.0% 3.3% 
Togo 10.0% 10.0% 10.8% 10.0% 10.0% 
ALL --- 10.0% 14.2% 5.0% 7.5% 
Percentage of months in which the real price would have deviated more than 50 % from the mean. 
 
 Except in Benin and Burkina Faso, a peg to the euro would have been the best choice to 
minimize the variability of the prices in the ECOWAS countries. Indeed, the coefficient of 
variation reveals that there would have been less monthly variability in the real prices if the 
countries had been pegged to the euro compared with a situation where they had been pegged 
to other currencies. Similarly, there would have been substantially fewer months outside 50% 
of mean under a peg to the euro. A striking feature concerns the non-CFA zone countries, 
most of which followed flexible exchange rate regimes during the period under examination. 
It is seen, from Table 3, that they would have experienced more stable export revenues, in 
nominal terms, if they had adopted a peg regime. The reason is simply that during the fall of 
the prices of the exported commodities, their external balance deteriorates, thereby implying a 
collapse of the domestic currency; however, this translated in much higher local currency 
revenues in the subsequent years. This is remarkable in regard to the fact that, theoretically, a 
flexible exchange rate is recommended to help offsetting the effects of adverse price 
movements. The counterpart may be a higher volatility. For these countries, a peg to the euro 
would have been the best both in terms of maximizing the exports revenues and minimizing 
the volatility. 
 In the policy circles, there have been periodic proposals that non-CFA zone countries in 
ECOWAS adopt the CFA franc (such an idea has been recurrent in Guinea and Ghana). The 
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results from the above simulations could have been an argument in favour of such a choice. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria would have been confronted to a trade-off. We see, in Table 5, that the 
floating exchange rate regime (actual history) leads to a smother path as compared with any 
other peg regimes (lowest variability). So, for Nigeria pegging to a currency would have been 
better to maximize its export revenues (being tied to the euro being the best choice), but the 
floating regime was the best to avoid too much volatility in the real prices.  
 The case of Benin and Burkina Faso is appealing owing to the fact that their main 
exported commodity is cotton. A substantial variability of the price of this commodity in the 
international markets stems from variations in the demand for cotton by the main importers, 
among which China is a leader buyer. We see from the tables that Benin and Burkina Faso 
would have experienced a decrease in the variability of the real commodity prices, if their 
currency had been tied to that of China or in dollar (the yuan and the dollar have been 
intimately linked to each other)7.  
 
Stability of commodity prices under alternative pegs 
 An additional criterion that may help to judge whether a given anchor currency might 
have been suitable is the persistence of the nominal and real commodity prices. The idea is to 
examine the length of time it takes for any initial shocks (stemming from either the CPI, the 
nominal exchange rate against the dollar or the dollar price of the commodities) to dissipate or 
to revert to their means of a deterministic trend. This question is important, both in the case of 
negative shocks (price variations implying a decrease in the export revenues) and positive 
shocks (price rises inducing a higher income). Persistent negative shocks result in debt and 
balance of payment crises, as well as in a substantial decrease in the income. Persistent 
positive shocks translate into Dutch disease with a decline of the economic sectors other than 
the exported sector (most resources are shift away from the non-traded sectors to the latter).     
 It is known that shocks to world commodity prices (nominal) have a slow mean reversion 
taking at least three years to dissipate. Indeed, they are described by cycles with a long 
duration (see, among others, Cashin et al. (2002)). The important point is that they are mean-
reverting. Consequently, any “infinite” persistence in the ECOWAS countries’ prices may 
come from the exchange rates, the CPI or both.  
 Theoretically, it is believed that floating exchange rate allows a more automatic 
adjustment to price shocks compared with fixed regimes, which implies that the nominal and 
real commodity prices under floating regimes should be more mean-reverting than under a 
peg regime.   
 Tables 4.1 through 4.4 contain unit root tests applied to the nominal and real prices under 
the actual history and the alternative peg. Considering the individual countries, the 
conclusions that emerge from the tables is that none of the exchange rate regimes led or 
                                                 
7 All  these conclusions  remain  true when  the variability  is captured by GARCH models  (estimations available 
upon  request  to authors). As  far as  the  size of  the  shocks  is  concerned,  the best anchor  currency  for many 
countries proves  to be  the Euro except  the Yen  for Nigeria. On  the  contrary, according  to  the  convergence 
speed, we could not get the consistent results.  
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would have led to a stable (mean-reverting) dynamic, except the commodity peg. Owing to 
the fact that we have a “short” sample of ten years (even if the frequency of the data is 
monthly), the acceptation of the unit root hypothesis does not mean that the shock hitting the 
commodity prices never dissipates, but simply that they do so at a (very) slow rate. And there 
seems not to be strong differences between the countries that adopted a peg (the CFA 
countries and Cape Verde) and those operating with a flexible exchange rate (non-CFA zone 
countries). Only a “commodity standard” could work well in influencing the duration of 
shocks. 
 A picture that emerges from the above the developments is that the countries would not 
agree on the foreign currency to which they should have pegged their currencies. Even, it is 
not sure that pegging the domestic currency would have been a good choice for all them.  
 Table 5 summarizes the best choice according to the three goals: maximizing the export 
revenues, minimizing their variability and reducing the persistence of shocks. 
 In attempting to draw policy conclusions from the above analysis, specifically concerning 
the choice of a common peg by the countries, it seems that there are several alternatives. 
Some economists would say that more important is the choice made by Nigeria because this 
country accounts for more than the half of ECOWAS’ GDP and population. In this regard, 
concerns matter about the question as whether pegging the future common currency would be 
a better choice than keeping a floating currency (in particular, if one considers the second 
goal). So, if the countries give the leadership to Nigeria for the conduct of monetary policy, 
then the trade-off between the three goals would depend on their respective weight in the 
central banker’s preferences. 
 However, although Nigeria weights more than the half of the income of the ECOWAS 
region, the successfulness of the exchange rate policy in the future currency union may 
depend on the stability of the “social utility” that is the aggregation of the utility functions of 
both the CFA zone countries (represented by the BCEAO) and all non-CFA zone countries 
(represented by the future WAMZ).  
 
Table 4.1. The unit root ADF test for individual nominal & real prices under the actual history 
 Nominal prices Real prices 
 T-statistics P-values Stability T-statistics P-values Stability 
Benin -2.94 0.04 Stable -1.89 0.34 non-stable 
Burkina Faso -2.84 0.06 non-stable -2.05 0.27 non-stable 
Cape Verde -1.96 0.30 non-stable -2.05 0.27 non-stable 
Côte d'Ivoire -2.17 0.22 non-stable -2.53 0.11 non-stable 
Gambia, The -1.53 0.51 non-stable -1.87 0.34 non-stable 
Ghana 1.28 1.00 non-stable -2.70 0.08 non-stable 
Guinea -1.01 0.75 non-stable -1.54 0.51 non-stable 
Guinea-Bissau -3.16 0.03 Stable -2.32 0.17 non-stable 
Mali -0.44 0.90 non-stable -1.69 0.43 non-stable 
Niger -1.30 0.63 non-stable -1.81 0.38 non-stable 
Nigeria -2.09 0.25 non-stable -2.66 0.08 non-stable 
Senegal -2.68 0.08 non-stable -3.34 0.02 Stable 
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Null Hypothesis: Each variable has a unit root.  Exogenous variables: Constant, not trend. 
ADF test: More (less) than 5% of P-values means non-stable (stable) of each variable. 
 
Table 4.2. The group unit root test (1) 
The null hypothesis is set under the assumption of common unit root process, i.e., Levin, Lin & Chu 
test. 
 Nominal prices Real prices 
 T-
statistics 
P-values Stability T-statistics P-values Stability 
Actual history 0.97 0.83 Stable -1.51 0.07 non-stable 
Dollar peg 1.34 0.91 non-stable 1.69 0.95 non-stable 
Yen peg 0.51 0.70 non-stable 0.63 0.74 non-stable 
Euro peg -0.10 0.46 non-stable 0.40 0.65 non-stable 
Yuan peg -0.91 0.18 non-stable -0.27 0.39 non-stable 
Commodity peg -1.56 0.06 non-stable -1.66 0.05 Stable 
 
Table 4.3 The group unit root test (2) 
The null hypothesis is set under the assumption of individual unit root process, i.e., Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W test. (The results of ADF-Fisher Chi-square test or PP-Fisher Chi-square test can be found in 
the excel file) 
 Nominal prices Real prices 
 T-
statistics 
P-values Stability T-statistics P-values Stability 
Actual history 0.56 0.71 non-stable -2.23 0.01 Stable 
Dollar peg 1.06 0.85 non-stable 0.69 0.75 non-stable 
Yen peg -0.03 0.49 non-stable 0.16 0.56 non-stable 
Euro peg -1.07 0.14 non-stable -1.21 0.11 non-stable 
Yuan peg -1.08 0.14 non-stable -1.06 0.14 non-stable 
Commodity peg -0.30 0.38 non-stable -1.77 0.04 Stable 
 
Table 4.4. The ADF unit root test for all index (3) 
 Nominal prices Real prices 
 T-
statistics 
P-values Stability T-statistics P-values Stability 
Dollar peg -1.60 0.48 non-stable -1.57 0.49 non-stable 
Yen peg -2.01 0.28 non-stable -1.92 0.32 non-stable 
Euro peg -1.94 0.31 non-stable -2.13 0.23 non-stable 
Yuan peg -1.63 0.46 non-stable -1.72 0.42 non-stable 
Commodity peg -1.10 0.71 non-stable -1.15 0.69 non-stable 
 
 
4.- Misalignments of the real effective exchange rate alternative pegs 
 We now turn to analyzing the effect of alternative pegs on the real exchange rate 
misalignments. The latter are defined as the discrepancy between the observed exchange rates 
and their fundamental value. A wisdom methodology is to derive the fundamental value from 
a theoretical model. Here, we depart from the classical specifications of the determination of 
the fundamental value of the exchange rate (notably, models including Balassa-Samuelson 
Sierra Leone -0.42 0.90 non-stable -1.97 0.30 non-stable 
Togo 1.71 1.00 non-stable -0.16 0.94 non-stable 
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effects, net external assets). The ECOWAS countries lack developed financial markets and 
there are important controls of capital flows. Further, the potential output remains low and 
many hurdles to productivity growth are still at play. Instead, we consider a dependent 
economy model for small commodity exporting countries.  
 
Table 5. Best choice according to the different goals 
 Goal 1 
Maximizing                     
the export revenues 
Goal 2 
Minimizing   
the export 
variability 
Goal 3 
Reducing        
the persistence of 
shocks 
Benin  
and  
Burkina Faso 
1/ During price decreases :  
Euro peg  or Commodity peg 
2/ During price increases : yen peg  
Dollar peg  
or  
Yuan peg 
Nigeria 1/ During price decreases  
Commodity peg 
2/ During price increases : yen peg  
Flexible 
exchange rate 
The other countries 1/ During price decreases :  
 Commodity peg 
2/ During price increases : yen peg 
Euro peg 
 
 
 
 
Commodity peg 
 
4.1.- An exchange rate model of small commodity-dependent country 
 In this model the nominal and real exchange rates are defined for small commodity 
exporting countries, which are supposed to be price-takers in the world markets. The 
equilibrium exchange rate is expressed as a function of the countries’ trade prices, money 
supply and of the production on non-traded goods. The framework is inspired from previous 
papers dealing with “commodity currencies” (see for instance, Chen and Rogoff (2002), 
Clinton (2001), Djoudad et al. (2000), Sjaastad (1998) and for a recent presentation Kearns 
(2007)).  
 We consider an economy endowed with a fixed quantity of a commodity, X, that is 
exported (but not consumed by the domestic residents) and whose supply is inelastic. The 
commodity world price is denoted  .  
 There is a representative consumer who consumes a traded good, T, imported from 
abroad and a non-traded good of which he received an endowment each period. The utility 
function is given by: 
                                     
 (6) 
where  
                                 ,                                            (7) 
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and   is the real money.  is the discount factor. The budget constraint is written as 
follows: 
 
        
 (8) 
where  is the economy price index. ,  and  denote the holdings of a real 
bond, a domestic nominal bond and a foreign bond.  is the nominal exchange rate (price of 
the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency),   is the holding of money at the 
start of period t. The real bond pays a constant rate of return, r, and the nominal domestic and 
foreign bonds pay constant rates of return I and  . Each period the consumer receives 
government transfers whose value are .  
 It is assumed that there are no restrictions to trade, so that the law of one price holds and 
we have . The derivation of the nominal exchange rate stems from standard first-
order conditions and yields the following equation, in logarithmic form8: 
 (9) 
where E is the expectation operator. The world price of the exported commodity affects the 
nominal exchange rate through several channels.  
 Changes in the export price modify the net present value of expected wealth and this 
affects the nominal exchange rate in several manners. Firstly, the consumer can decide to 
increase his consumption of traded good, whose price (in local currency) must fall to obtain 
internal balance. This in turn yields an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate for the law 
of one price to hold9. This effect increases with the share of the imported good in total 
consumption   and with the ratio of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption  
relative to the elasticity of money demand  . Secondly, a positive wealth effect may induce 
an increase in the demand for non-tradable goods, thereby implying a rise in the consumer 
price index. To restore the equilibrium of the real money demand, the nominal exchange rate 
must appreciate. Thirdly, any positive variation in the export price modifies the future stream 
of the domestic money supply but the impact on the nominal exchange rate is ambiguous, 
though one would expect that an expansive monetary policy leads a nominal depreciation. 
Finally, an increase in the output of the non-traded good leads to a nominal appreciation of 
the exchange rate.  
 The above model can also be used to determine the variation of the real exchange rate to 
a variation in the export price. In this case, all the variables in the model are defined in terms 
                                                 
8 For a detailed proof, see Kearns (2007).  
9 The internal balance is defined by the equality between the supply,   and the demand  . An 
increase in   , all things being equal, implies that  must fall for the equality to hold.  
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of the general level of prices, . One difference is that the variations in the prices that affect P 
do not only induce adjustments in the nominal exchange rate to restore the equilibria, but also 
variations in the real exchange rate. In this regard, a rise in the export price of commodities 
will yield a real depreciation, all things being equal. 
 In this paper we focus on the real exchange rate and thus use equation (9) with the 
variables expressed in real terms. This equation is used to compute the fundamental value of 
the real exchange rate. .  
 
4.2.- The empirical model 
 We consider the empirical counterpart of equation (9), under the assumption that 
expectations of the future money stock are equal to its current value. We consider the possible 
persistence of the real exchange rate by including a lagged term in the regressors. 
Accordingly, we consider the following equation: 
         
 ,                         (10) 
where  is a disturbance term. This equation is used to compare the misalignments of the 
real exchange rate that would have prevailed in the ECOWAS countries under different pegs. 
We assume a “strict” peg: choosing an anchor foreign currency implies a level relationship 
between the domestic money stock and inflation and those of the anchor country. This means 
that money and inflation evolve proportionally to those of the anchor country. The exchange 
rate is the real effective exchange rate defined as follows. We compute the real effective 
exchange of the ECOWAS countries under the preceding assumption of convergence of the 
inflation rates. Therefore, the exchange rate is defined as the weighted average of the relative 
price indexes of the main trading partners of the ECOWAS countries and the price index of 
the anchor country.  
 Define . Then, the fundamental value of the real exchange rate is 
obtained by using the vector  .  
 
4.3.- Data and econometric methodology 
 We use monthly data from 1999 to 2008 and consider the following proxies for the 
variables.  
 ·Real effective exchange rate. For each country we construct a time series that is based on 
(i) the nominal effective exchange under a given peg (trade-weighted average of the anchor’s 
country bilateral nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the ECOWAS countries main trading 
partners10; (ii) differentials between the anchor country’s consumer price level and the trade-
weighted average of the price of the ECOWAS countries’ main trading partners. ECOWAS 
                                                 
10 We choose the major exporting countries accounting for minimum 70% of total exports. 
22 
 
countries’ main trading partner series are taken from IMF and COMTRADE trade statistics11, 
while the other series comes from the IFS database and national institutes of statistics.   
 
 ·Real export price of commodities. We use the same series as in the preceding section, the 
main difference being that we consider the real price commodity themselves but not their 
difference to actual history.  
 · Import prices and non-traded production. The price of exports of the anchor countries 
serve as a proxy for the ECOWAS countries’ import prices. Specifically, we consider the 
average of the export price of Japan, the Euro area and the United States. The series are taken 
from the IFS database. As for non-traded production, we did not find any series spanning over 
a long period of time in the ECOWAS countries. We thus consider that non-traded output 
accounts for a percentage of total GDP, this percentage being calculated as (1- ) where  is 
the degree of openness of a country (namely the sum of exports and imports to GDP). When 
only annual data were available, the series were then interpolated to a monthly frequency.  
 ·Monetary aggregates. We use the money stock M2 of the anchor country.  
 
 The econometric methodology relies on the following steps. Firstly, equation (10) is used 
to test for a level relationship between the endogenous variable and its explanatory variables, 
using the Pesaran et al. (2001)’s methodology (thereafter PSS). These authors have proposed 
a bound testing approach for testing the existence of a long-run relationship between a group 
of variables when the series have different time series properties (a mixture of stationary, I(0), 
I(1), I(2), structural breaks, etc). One advantage over the classical Engle-Granger or Johansen-
based approaches is that, one does not need to have a cointegration relationship to conclude 
that a long-run relationship exists. PSS test is therefore less restrictive.  
 In a second step, if we conclude to the existence of a level relationship, then equation 
(10) is estimated using a generalized least squares estimator and taking into account structural 
breaks when they are present in the data. The robustness of the estimation is tested using 
misspecifications tests on the estimated residuals.  
 Thirdly, we compute the misalignments of the real exchange rate as the discrepancy 
between the observed values and the estimated values expressed in percentage of the 
estimated values. It is noteworthy that, since the mean of the residuals of the estimated model 
is zero (if correctly estimated), we compute separately the average of the misalignment 
corresponding to positive (undervaluation) and negative residuals (overvaluation). We do not 
take all the residuals, but consider only the discrepancies that are “significant enough”. To 
this end, only the residuals that are greater than a benchmark (the latter is chosen as the 
estimated the standard errors of the residuals).   
 
 
                                                 
11 See Table A.2 in appendix.  
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4.4.- Interpreting the results 
 Table 6 contains our results. For each peg, we report the Wald statistics corresponding to 
the PSS test and compare their value to the two bounds corresponding to the case where the 
estimated models contain restricted trends and unrestricted intercepts (the lower and upper 
bounds with four explanatory variables are respectively equal to 3.05 and 3.97. The null of 
no-level relationship is rejected when the Wald statistic lies above the upper bound, which 
happens in our case for all the countries. We also report the estimated coefficients and the 
percentage of under- and overvaluation12. 
 
Impact of real commodity prices on the real exchange rates 
 The different magnitudes of the variation of the real effective exchange rate around its 
mean value can be interpreted by considering what happens in the country dependent model 
when a given currency prevails as an external anchor, while the invoicing currency is different 
(according to the structure of the exports of the African countries).   
Table A.2 in appendix shows the major export destinations for the ECOWAS countries 
(average percentage of total exports over 1999 to 2008). The data reveals that, the euro area is 
an important trading partner, but it does not emerge as the main one for a majority of 
countries. Only in 7 out of the 14 countries the euro area accounts for around half or more of 
their total exports (Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, and Sierra-
Leone). The Asian emerging countries and other developing countries gain important shares 
of export (notably in Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal and Togo) and the 
United-States accounts for a great share of exports in Nigeria.  We accordingly have two 
invoice currencies, namely the euro and the US dollar (the Asian emerging countries pay the 
imports in dollar).  
The dependent economy model maintains that the nominal exchange rate adjust in order to 
restore the internal equilibrium after a wealth effect following an increase in the price of real 
commodities (through a decrease in the price of traded-goods and real money balance effects). 
For instance, after an export price increase, the internal balance is retrieved through an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The strength of this effect conditions the 
magnitude of variation of the exchange rate during the adjustment process. It depends upon 
whether the domestic firms sell in the foreign countries in the producers’ currency –here the 
anchor currency – or whether the invoicing price is the foreign countries’ currency (because 
the invoice price affects the net present value of the expected wealth in local currency). These 
two cases correspond to the so-called “producer-currency pricing (PCP)” and “local currency 
pricing (LCP)”.  
 We consider here the LCP, which is the most interesting case to comment our results. We 
can construct a classification of the strength of variation of the nominal exchange rate in 
different configurations. To this end, let us first consider what the bilateral parities of the 
                                                 
12 We  do  not  report  the  results  of  the  misspecification  tests  on  the  estimated  residuals  to  avoid  an 
overabundance of tables. The results are available upon request to authors.  
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anchor currencies were against the euro and the dollar over the period from 1999 to 2008 
(Table 6) 
 
Table 6. Variation of bilateral parities over 1999-2008 
 Export zone currencies 
 Euro Dollar 
Anchor currencies   
Dollar Depreciation - 
Euro - Appreciation 
Yen Huge depreciation (around 20%) Small depreciation (5-6%) 
Yuan Depreciation Small appreciation 
 
 Secondly, we can summarize what the magnitude of the wealth effect would be in the 
dependent economy model following a decrease or an increase in the export prices (see Table 
7). In a LCP price-setting, the size of the wealth effect (the variation of the export income in 
local currency) varies with export destinations, the appreciation or depreciation of the anchor 
currency vis-à-vis the currency used to invoice the exports, increasing or decreasing world 
prices of the exported commodities. To take an example, suppose that a country is pegged to 
euro while invoicing its price in dollar and that the world prices of its exports raise by x%. If 
the euro appreciates vis-à-vis the dollar, then the additional export income, in euro, from the 
increase in the world price will increase by less than x% (“weak” wealth effect). Even, in case 
of a huge appreciation, the world price increase of exports may translate into a decrease in the 
export revenues in euro! Conversely, a depreciation of the euro leads a more than proportional 
increase in the export revenues expressed in euro (“strong” wealth effects). The higher the 
size of the wealth effect, the more important will be the variation of the nominal exchange 
rate during the adjustment process to equilibrium. The conclusions are symmetric in case of a 
decrease in the world price of exports.  
 Although, we observed that the dynamics of the world prices of the commodities 
exported by the ECOWAS countries have undergone two separate episodes of downward and 
ascending trends (from 1999 to 2002 and then from 2003 onwards), their dynamics over the 
entire period shows an upward oriented evolution.   
How large an impact do export prices have on the real exchange rate also depends on 
price effects. In the dependent economy model, an increase in the export price is associate 
with an increase in the general level of prices (for instance if the consumers buy more non-
traded goods). This induces a real appreciation. Therefore, the adjustment of the nominal 
exchange rate and the variations of the general price level play in the same directions as to 
their impact on the real exchange rate. If the price effect is strong enough, it can amplify the 
variations of the real exchange rate compared with its variations involved by the adjustment 
of the nominal exchange rate. 
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Table 7.  Expected magnitudes of the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate 
 Case of a decrease in the World price of the exports 
 Exporting area 
Anchor 
currency 
Euro area Dollar area 
Dollar Weak wealth effects and thus weak 
amplitude of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
- 
Euro - Strong wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Yen Weak wealth effects and thus weak 
amplitude of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Very weak wealth effects and thus very 
small variations of the nominal exchange 
rate during the adjustment to a new 
equilibrium 
Yuan Weak wealth effects and thus weak 
amplitude of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Strong wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Case of an increase in the World price of the exports 
 Exporting area 
Anchor 
currency 
Euro area Dollar area 
Dollar Strong wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
- 
Euro - Weak wealth effects and thus weak 
amplitude of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Yen Strong wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Stronger wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Yuan Strong wealth effects and thus ample 
variations of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
Weak wealth effects and thus weak 
amplitude of the nominal exchange rate 
during the adjustment to a new equilibrium 
 
 
 Table 8. Misalignments of the real exchange rate and estimation of the country-dependent model 
Country Peg Wald test % 
undervaluation 
(positive 
residuals) 
% 
overvaluation 
(negative 
residuals) 
     
Burkina Faso Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
16,53 
13,06 
17,75 
21,62 
8,71 
6,15 
2,76 
5,25 
10,33 
7,64 
2,33 
4,99 
0,77* 
0,93* 
0,82* 
0,65* 
-0,35** 
-0,44** 
-0,92* 
-0,42* 
-0,02 
-0,016 
-0,047** 
-0,03 
-0,43* 
-0,57* 
0,90* 
-0,25* 
0,02 
0,076 
0,141 
0,05 
Côte d’Ivoire Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
10,81 
6,96 
6,48 
7,78 
23 
7,80 
2,67 
4,13 
29,67 
6,36 
2,56 
4,11 
0,89* 
0,74* 
0,90* 
0,91* 
-0,56* 
-0,44* 
-0,73* 
-0,58* 
-0,07* 
-0,03* 
0,02 
-0,05* 
-0,17* 
-0,25* 
-0,15 
-0,24* 
-0,08 
-0,02 
-0,04 
-0,03 
The Gambia Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
6,90 
6,54 
6,79 
7,08 
21,65 
4,44 
2,33 
7,86 
27,29 
4,22 
2,23 
5,43 
1,00* 
0,97* 
0,98* 
0,96* 
-0,65* 
-0,89* 
-0,85* 
-0,84* 
-0,03 
-0,02** 
-0,08* 
-0,04 
0,01 
-0,024 
0,028 
-0,003 
-0,33* 
-0,03 
-0,07 
-0,07 
Ghana Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
11,97 
10,78 
16,93 
8,91 
21,90 
6,26 
1,81 
5,62 
23,23 
7,63 
1,98 
3,91 
0,84* 
0,55* 
0,70* 
0,89* 
-0,22* 
-0,27* 
-0,06 
-0,22* 
0,023 
-0,03** 
0,037 
0,02 
-0,51* 
-0,30* 
-0,67* 
-0,58* 
-0,11** 
0,014 
0,021 
-0,08 
Guinea Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
7,52 
8,07 
6,28 
6,58 
23,80 
6,09 
2,31 
5,08 
21,74 
5,02 
2,12 
4,08 
1,02* 
0,97* 
0,99* 
0,96* 
-0,64* 
-0,89* 
-0,85* 
-0,84* 
-0,169* 
-0,04* 
-0,107* 
-0,156* 
-0,30* 
-0,66* 
-0,43* 
-0,48* 
-0,07 
0,007 
-0,028 
-0,01 
Guinea Bissau Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
8,90 
6,06 
7,10 
11,25 
2,33 
1,87 
3,91 
14,97 
3,02 
2,14 
3,75 
22,23 
0,98* 
0,95* 
0,94* 
0,96* 
-0,73* 
-0,724* 
-0,65* 
-0,61* 
-0,09* 
-0,02 
-0,05* 
-0,04 
-0,180* 
-0,205* 
-0,33* 
-0,35* 
-0,06 
-0,028 
0,038 
-0,01 
Mali Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
11,67 
8,17 
8,71 
13,59 
9,00 
2,23 
2,55 
10,65 
6,70 
2,89 
2,53 
6,72 
0,95* 
0,95* 
0,96* 
0,91* 
-1,14* 
-0,36* 
-0,84* 
-0,76* 
-0,184* 
-0,023 
-0,138* 
-0,172* 
0,31 
-0,59* 
-0,117 
-0,187 
-0,12** 
0,005 
-0,011 
0,03 
Note : * and ** means that the coefficients are statistically significant, respectively at the 1% and 5% level.  
 
 
27 
 
Table 8 (continued). Misalignments of the real exchange rate and estimation of the country-dependent model 
Country Peg Wald test % 
undervaluation 
(positive 
residuals) 
% 
overvaluation 
(negative 
residuals) 
     
Niger Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
12,75 
6,11 
9,10 
6,93 
17,34 
6,24 
2,21 
7,05 
20,74 
5,94 
2,46 
5,73 
0,71* 
0,99* 
0,96* 
0,73* 
-0,31 
-0,50* 
-0,59* 
-0,46* 
-0,06 
-0,0006 
-0,02 
-0,06 
-0,37 
-0,48* 
-0,34* 
-0,317* 
-0,03 
-0,005 
-0,03 
0,03 
Nigeria Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
8,09 
14,89 
4,38 
7,93 
10,92 
11,48 
1,89 
3,72 
17,60 
14,33 
1,89 
4,23 
0,83* 
0,95* 
0,96* 
0,87* 
-0,803* 
-0,66* 
-0,93* 
-0,66* 
-0,04* 
-0,01 
-0,02 
-0,019 
0,009 
-0,131* 
0,026 
-0,102** 
-0,03 
-0,04 
-0,006 
-0,002 
Senegal Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
7,25 
21,59 
14,07 
7,36 
10,63 
0,82 
2,4 
9,44 
8,44 
0,76 
2,56 
7,30 
0,95* 
0,96* 
0,89* 
0,92* 
-0,36* 
-0,147* 
-0,59* 
-0,46* 
-0,026 
-0,004 
-0,06* 
-0,06* 
-0,50* 
-0,82* 
-0,29 
-0,356* 
-0,09 
0,005 
0,06 
-0,047 
Sierra Leone Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
10,81 
11,31 
6,43 
9,08 
176 
10,97 
2,12 
5,54 
44,79 
12,21 
2,13 
4,31 
0,81* 
0,95* 
0,87* 
0,72* 
-1,01* 
-0,76* 
-1,08* 
-0,71* 
0,0 
-0,007 
-0,016 
0,004 
0,256 
-0.198* 
0,25 
-0,03 
-0,05 
0,001 
-0,048 
0,005 
Togo Dollar 
Euro 
Yen 
Yuan 
8,20 
4,93 
9,09 
9,37 
11,60 
9,82 
2,57 
3,98 
17,23 
12,88 
2,24 
3,69 
0,83* 
0,95* 
0,96* 
0,87* 
-0,67* 
-1,03* 
-0,85* 
-0,67* 
-0,018 
0,05* 
-0,07* 
-0,057* 
-0,07 
0,13** 
-0,09 
-0,162** 
-0,08** 
-0,06 
-0,01 
-0,038 
Note : * and ** means that the coefficients are statistically significant, respectively at the 1% and 5% level.  
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 The computed residuals between the observed and estimated fundamental real exchange 
rate are reported in Table 8 and some results accord well with the conclusions of Table 7. To 
take some examples, consider the cases of Cape Verde and Sierra-Leone, two countries whose 
share of exports towards Europe is particularly high, covering above 70% (respectively 
85,73% and 72,70%). Under a peg to the US dollar, we obtain the highest discrepancies as 
compared with the other countries in the sample. This indicates a sharp appreciation or 
depreciation of the real exchange rate when the latter evolves under or above its fundamental 
value to restore the internal and external equilibrium after a shock. Other countries share a 
similar feature. Indeed, we also find high under- and overvaluations of the exchange rates 
from their fundamental value for the Gambia, Ghana, Niger, countries whose exports towards 
the euro area accounts for around half of their total exports. Conversely, under a peg to the 
euro, countries that would have invoiced their exports in US dollar (those exporting to a dollar 
zone) would have experienced slow deviations of the exchange rate from its fundamental 
value, because the magnitude of adjustment of the nominal exchange rate after an export price 
shock would have been small (due to weak wealth effects caused by an anchor currency that 
appreciates against the invoice currency). Examples are Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali 
and Togo.    
We also find evidence that a peg to the yen turns out to yield the lowest discrepancies, 
for all the countries whatever their exporting zone. This suggests that, in addition to the 
adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, another factor is at play when an economy is hit by 
a shock in the export prices.  Although the dependent economy model dichotomizes the real 
and money spheres in the steady-state (the nominal exchange moves to restore the real money 
balances), during the transition path to a new equilibrium, the increase in the general level of 
prices caused by the higher export incomes alters the purchasing  power of money.  This 
translates into a decrease in the demand for non-traded goods and to a downward pressure on 
the general price level (the so-called Pigou effect). Lower prices result in a real depreciation 
of the domestic currency. If the real money effect is strong enough, it attenuates the effects of 
the nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate.  
An interesting question here is the following. Why would such real money effects have 
been stronger, had the countries been peg to the yen? The answer is that real money effects 
show asymmetries between inflationary and deflationary environments. A decrease in the 
purchasing power of money is more heavily felt by the consumers if initial prices were 
diminishing as compared with a situation where they were already increasing or with a 
situation where prices are usually at a low level. Over the period from 1999 to 2008, the 
inflation situation in Japan has differed markedly from the other countries, since this country 
faced a deflation. In our simulations, the importance of real money effects – playing in an 
opposite direction with regard to the nominal exchange rate - could explain why we find small 
deviations between the observed and fundamental real exchange rates.  
As to the yuan peg, the countries’ situation is a mixture of what happens under the other 
pegs, with  smaller sizes of misalignments as compared with the dollar and euro peg for one 
country out of two (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire,  Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Togo.  
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Explaining the negative impact of monetary stock on the real exchange rate 
 Another feature from the estimations that deserves some comments is the negative sign of 
the money variable. On the face of it this result may appear surprising, since we would expect 
from the theoretical model that the nominal exchange rate needs depreciates when the stock of 
money increases. It must be kept in mind that the estimations do not tell us what happened 
indeed, since we are doing a counterfactual exercise. They simply say which sign of the 
money coefficient we obtain for the simulated series of the real exchange rates to fit in with 
the dependent economy model. In such a model one obtains negative signs if there are 
systematic expectation errors about the monetary process. Such errors happen when the 
monetary stock is highly persistent, but the agents believe that it includes a large transitory 
component13.  
 The misperception as to the persistence of shocks leads the agents to under-estimate the 
impact of shocks on the future money supply. Accordingly, the markets can expect a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate when an appreciation would in fact occur. So, the 
exchange rate may initially move in the wrong direction, thereby explaining the occurrence of 
misalignments. This expectation bias can be viewed as a “peso” problem stemming from a 
slow adaptation of monetary adaptation. The high persistence of the real money stock used in 
our simulations are shown in Table 9 
 
Table 9.  Unit root tests on the level and first-difference of the real money stocks m (and  ) 
  KPSS ERS 
 m  Conclusion M  Conclusion 
USA 0.24* 0.15 I(1) -2.53* -3.54 I(1) 
Euro area 0.32* 1.03* I(2) -0.88* 0.85* I(2) 
Japan 0.30* 0.37 I(1) -0.94* -1.11* I(2) 
China 0.31* 0.94* I(2) -0.09* -10.66 I(1) 
Critical value 
(5%) 
0.146 0.463 - -3.01 -1.94 - 
Note: KPSS and ERS refer to the unit root tests proposed by Kwiatkowski et al (1992) and Elliot et al. (1996). The tests 
include an intercept plus a trend for the series in level and an intercept for the first-difference. In the KPSS tests, the null of a 
stationary process is rejected whenever the computed statistic lies above the critical value, while the null of a unit root 
process is accepted when the computed statistic is above the critical value. * means that the null hypothesis is rejected. 
 
Another interpretation of the negative coefficients of the money variable is that we have 
two contradictory effects at play. On the one hand, provided that there are no errors 
expectations, any increase in the nominal stock of money implies a depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate. Indeed, this rise implies a higher real money balance that allows the 
                                                 
13 For a formal proof, we refer the reader to Kearns (2007). 
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consumer to increase their consumption today without scarifying their consumption 
tomorrow. In particular, they may choose to increase their consumption of the traded good 
(substitution effects) and the increased price of this good induces a nominal depreciation (for 
the law of one price for the law of one price to hold) and thus a real depreciation. On the other 
hand, the consumers may choose to increase both their consumptions of non-tradables and 
tradables, causing an increase in the consumer price index and, accordingly, a real 
appreciation. The total effect thus depends upon the relative strength of both effects. The 
negative coefficients indicate that the effect of the prices dominates that of the nominal 
exchange rate.   
 
Which peg as regards external competitiveness? 
 If minimizing the misalignments of the observed real exchange from its fundamental 
value is the most important consideration for the ECOWAS countries, then choosing the yen 
would have been their optimal choice. Some would claim that that there is no gain from 
retaining an anchor of a foreign country with which the African countries trade very little. So, 
since the euro area and dollar zones represent a much higher fraction of their respective trade, 
we can safely ignore the yen peg according to this point of view.  
 The dollar peg or euro peg are better yardsticks to gauge the optimal choice of the 
countries. As can be seen from the tables, the dollar peg would have led to stronger 
misalignments than the euro, with important misalignments in the countries whose fraction of 
exports to the United States is big. The main reason is the depreciation of the dollar against 
the euro in a context of rising world commodity prices and inflationary pressures in both the 
euro area and dollar zones.  
 An optimally designed anchor policy should evolve across time in regard to the changes 
affecting the fundamentals that induce changes in the real exchange rate. Of course, one 
hurdle is that such a policy may not be practical to implement. 
 As regards the external competitiveness, the countries may disagree on the choice of their 
anchor exchange rate. This stems from the incidence of invoicing in a currency different from 
the currency to which they would be pegged. The countries show a great heterogeneity and it 
may be suggested in this case to choose a basket of currencies.  
 
 
5.- Conclusion 
 Our results suggest that the choice of an anchor country as regards the internal and 
external competitiveness may be a dynamic choice, with varying anchors across time. If, the 
countries has adopted a peg regime in the past, we have seen that their policy should have 
differ from 1999-2002 to 2003-08 in terms of export profitability since the international prices 
of commodities evolved from a downward trending to upward oriented movements. 
Concerning the external competitiveness, the choice would have depended on the evolution of 
the fundamentals influencing the real exchange rate. Accordingly, one difficulty here come 
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from the fact that the countries should not be advised to lock into a given exchange rate peg 
and stick to it, even when the determinants of the exchange rate change their dynamics in 
time.  
 Besides, there seems to be contradictions between the objectives of internal and external 
competitiveness, as well as between the different goals they pursue under each type of 
competitiveness. For instance, pegging to a currency that is depreciating (resp. appreciating) 
when the world price of commodities are rising (resp. decreasing) could be a good choice in 
terms of the maximization of the export profitability, but as regards external competitiveness 
this choice could yield strong misalignments of the real exchange rate because of the 
incidence of the invoicing price. Another example is the call for a peg to export price index 
formulated by Frankel. This suggestion may have been appropriate for the countries when 
declining terms of trade were observed. However, this does no longer seem to be the case 
during periods of rising commodity prices as we have experienced in the recent years. We 
saw that other anchors would yield higher export income.  
 What this means is that, for the ECOWAS countries, the choice of an anchor would 
imply to establish a hierarchy between different goals that are contradictory. The outcome 
may depend upon the preferences of each state and the manner in which the latter will 
aggregate. In this sense, the governments are right when they argue that the choice of a 
currency peg is above all a political decision.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. De Facto Exchange rate regimes for the member countries in West Africa 
Member countries Exchange rate regime 
Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d'Ivoire,  
Guinea- Bissau,  
Mali, Niger,  Senegal, 
Togo 
- Fixed Exchange rate regime: Conventional fixed peg arrangement  
(De jure, Exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender)  
- Currency Union: West African Economic and Monetary Union 
- Common Currency: CFA franc  
1948-1998.12.31: pegged to the French franc  
1994.1.12: 50% devaluation (1 Euro = 50 Æ 100 CFA F) 
1997.5.2: Guinea-Bissau joined this union (1 CFA F = 65 Guinean Peso) 
1999.1.1-: pegged to the Euro (1 Euro = 655.957 CFA F) 
Cape Verde - Fixed Exchange rate regime: Conventional fixed peg arrangement  
- Currency: Cape Verde Escudo 
1998.3.30-: pegged to the Portuguese Escudo 
1999.1.1-: pegged to the Euro (1 Euro = 110.265 CV Escudo) 
Gambia, The  - Flexible Exchange rate regime: Managed floating with no preannounced path for the  
exchange rate and Cross rates based on a fixed relationship to the Pound Sterling 
(De jure, Independently Floating)  Monetary aggregate target 
- Currency: Gambian Dalasi  
2014.6: “West African Monetary Zone”, Common Currency “the ECO”      
Ghana  - Flexible Exchange rate regime: Managed floating with no preannounced path for the 
exchange rate,  pegged to the US Dollar   
 (De jure, Independently Floating)  Inflation targeting 
- Currency: Ghanaian Cedi 
2007.7.3: redenominated (1 new Cedi = 10000 old Cedi)  
2014.6: “West African Monetary Zone”, Common Currency “the ECO”          
Guinea - Flexible Exchange rate regime: Managed floating with no preannounced path for the 
 exchange rate  (De jure, Independently Floating)  Monetary aggregate target 
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- Currency: Guinean franc  
2014.6: “West African Monetary Zone”, Common Currency “the ECO”      
Nigeria  - Flexible Exchange rate regime: Managed floating with no preannounced path for the 
exchange rate,  pegged to the US Dollar   Monetary aggregate target 
- Currency: Naira  
2014.6: “West African Monetary Zone”, Common Currency “the ECO”      
Sierra Leone - Fixed Exchange rate regime: Conventional fixed peg arrangement 
 (De jure, Independently Floating)  Monetary aggregate target 
- Currency: Leone 
1964: Fixed exchange regime (2 Leone = 1 British West African Pound)  
1990: Flexible exchange rate regime was adopted 
But now, De Facto, pegged to the US Dollar 
2014.6: “West African Monetary Zone”, Common Currency “the ECO”      
Source: De Facto classification of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks as of April 31 2008 
by International Monetary Fund (IMF). We also refer to De jure classification as of May 31 2001 and Country 
note 2009 from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
Table A.2. Major exporting countries 
Member countries Main exporting countries and shares 
Benin China 15.5%  EU 13.42%  India 13.2% 
Burkina Faso EU 22.58%  China 15.73%  Singapore 12.8% 
Cape Verde EU 84.72%  USA 10.72% 
Côte d'Ivoire EU 48.18%  (USA 8.93%) 
Gambia, The EU 53.4%  India 16.34% 
Ghana EU 51.27%  (USA 8.5%) 
Guinea EU 51.13%  USA 10.33%   
Guinea-Bissau EU 5.81%  Uruguay 14.53% India  57.82% Nigeria 10.25% 
Mali EU 27.3%  China 13.84%  Thailand 12.75% 
Niger EU 41.76%  Nigeria 28.9%  Japan 11.49% 
Nigeria USA 41.8%  EU 22.03% 
Senegal EU 34.42%  India 14.48%  Mali 10.58% 
Sierra Leone EU 73.88%  (USA 9.29%) 
Togo Ghana 16.79%  EU 16.39%  Benin 11.1%  Burkina Faso10.6% 
Source: UN Comtrade database. The exporting country shares are averaged index during the period of 
1999-2006. We refer to only the shares more than 10% (in case of USA, the shares more than 8%).  
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Figure A.1. Movement of the Dollar price of main commodities during the period of 1999-2008 
1.1. Aluminum (US Dollar / 1 Tonne) 
 
 
1.2. Cacao (US Dollar / 1 Tonne) 
 
 
1.3. Cotton (US Dollar / 1 Tonne) 
 
 
 
1.4. Gold (US Dollar / 1g) 
 
 
1.5. Oil (US Dollar / 1 Baril) 
 
 
1.6.  Uranium (US Dollar / 1 Pound) 
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Figure A.2. Deviations of the real prices under a given peg relative to actual regime 
Blue line: Dollar peg,  Brown: Yen peg,  Green: Euro peg,  Violet: Yuan peg,  and  
Light Blue: Commodity peg  
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A.2.7. Guinea 
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A.2.13. Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
A.2.14. Togo 
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